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Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
17:21:04 Monday, March 1, 2004
Hope you all have had a good start in 2004.
I wonder if any of you have a complete crew-list for Beaufort N1163? F/Sgt. Fullagar of this crew is buried at Vanse churchyard. Also crew positions and mission type is of interest.
Beaufort AW375 was lost 17/05/1942. What mission were this a/c on?
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: Francis Marshall (Guest)
20:11:14 Monday, March 1, 2004
>Hope you all have had a
>good start in 2004.
>I wonder if any of you
>have a complete crew-list for
>Beaufort N1163? F/Sgt. Fullagar of
>this crew is buried at
>Vanse churchyard. Also crew positions
>and mission type is of
Full crew were:
W/O J.E. Woodward, Sgt L.T. Powles, Sgt K.P.J. Fullager and Sgt A.R. Credland
On a Shipping Strike with P/O Sellick. Shot down by Oberleutnant Sch%E4fer of the I./JG 77.
>Beaufort AW375 was lost 17/05/1942. What
>mission were this a/c on?
One of a great many aircraft attempting to torpedo the Prinz Eugen which was returning to Germany after being severely damaged by a torpedo from an English U-boot.
Following the failure of the entire Beaufort force to inflict any damage at all, the aircraft was withdrawn from service over the North Sea.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: Chris Charland (Guest)
20:47:28 Monday, March 1, 2004
The only gen I have on Bristol Beaufort Mk. I s/n AW375, is that it belonged to No. 39 (TB) Squadron and crashed on take-off at Landing Ground 147, Bu Amud, Libya on the 17th of July, 1942.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
23:51:15 Monday, March 1, 2004
[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON 03-Jan-04 AT 11:52 PM (GMT)[/font][p]Hi Chris and Thomas,
Francis is correct.
AW375 was lost off Lister(Lista), Norway with the following crew:
W/C M F D Williams (PoW)
W/O A H A Morris RCAF
P/O J F V Saunders
F/Sgt J T Healey
Took off Leuchars at 17:58 hrs (details from draft Vol 2 of Coastal Losses)
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: floyd williston (Guest)
03:01:00 Thursday, April 1, 2004
They Shall Grow Not Old has AW375 as a 42 Sq. aircraft missing while on a strike off Norway. It lists F/S P.Fullagar in a crew with AHA Morris(Ottawa) and J.F.Saunders and one other, on May 17/42.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: Chris Charland (Guest)
04:08:06 Thursday, April 1, 2004
My source was the Air-Britain pub, Royal Air Force Aircraft AA100 to AZ999.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
08:54:06 Thursday, April 1, 2004
Happy new year!
the following comes fromthe Beaufort Aircrews newsletter Dec 2003.
At around 1530 hours on 14 October 1941, three Beauforts of No 42 Squadron based at Leuchars in Fife were ordered to make a torpedo attack on two enemy merchant vessels near Obrestad in Norway, although apparently they did not set off in formation. They were flown by Warr Off Woodward in N1163, Fg Off Pett in AW243 and P1t Off Sellick in X8929. At 1740 hours, Pett came across a sunken ship off the Norwegian coast, with its superstructure above water and a lifeboat hanging from a davit. He hunted further down the coast but found no other ships and returned safely to land at 2009 hours
In overcast and rainy conditions, Sellick found two vessels at 1733 hours, of about 1,500 and 2,000 tons, and attacked the smaller. There was heavy and light flak from both vessels, hitting the aircraft and wounding the observer, Sgt Martin, in the leg. The vessel was hit with their torpedo and emitted a high column of black smoke. As they came out of the attack at 1745 hours, the crew saw Woodward's Beaufort letter N going directly into the attack. It thus seems probable that James Woodward and his crew, Sgts Fowles, Fullager and Credland, were shot down by the vessels attacked by Sellick, who landed safely back at Leuchars at 2001 hours.
Note the spelling of of Sgt Fowles I dont know which is the typo.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
17:15:07 Thursday, April 1, 2004
Thanks to all for contributing. The reason for this inquiry is that i am making a list of aircrafts missing in action in Southern Norway, for my web-site.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: Carsten Petersen email@example.com (Guest)
18:28:38 Thursday, April 1, 2004
Gardening on the 15th and 16th of May, 1942
On the February 23rd, the heavy cruiser, ‘Prinz Eugen’ was torbedoed by the British submarine HMS Trident, when it was just off Norway's coast. ‘Prinz Eugen’ managed to make it to Trondheim, even though the stern was damaged and the rudder was jammed. During the next couple of months, emergency repairs of the heavy cruiser were carried out, but only a stay at a dock in Germany could completely repair the cruiser. In the middle of May, the British admirality was convinced that ‘Prinz Eugen’ would try to sail to Germany, and they assumed that the most probable route would go through Skagerrak, Kattegat and down through the Great Belt and the Baltic Sea. Because of this, Bomber Command was ordered to lay mines in all the probable sailing routes for Prinz Eugen.
The British leadership was also aware that the Panzerschiff ‘L%FCtzow’ was ready in the Baltic, and they assumed that that ship would attempt to slip into Norwean waters in the opposite direction of ‘Prinz Eugen’.
On the night between the 15th and the 16th of May, Bomber Command sent 50 aircraft out to lay mines.
The following aircraft were sent:
Group Dispatched Area
1 2 Wellingtons Helgoland (north)
3 16 Wellingtons Langelandsb%E6ltet (south)
3 10 Wellingtons Langelandsb%E6ltet (north)
5 16 Hampdens Storeb%E6lt (north)
5 1 Lancaster Storeb%E6lt (north)
5 2 Lancasters Storeb%E6lt (south)
5 3 Lancasters L%E6s%F8 Rende
The two Wellingtons from No. 1 Group dropped four mines near Helgoland in perfect weather. Both aircraft returned without problem.
The 26 Wellingtons from No. 3 Group, which were sent to the Great Belt, had a few more problems. One crew decided instead to drop their two mines at Horns Rev, while two aircraft returned before the target area without laying their mines. 21 aircraft dropped altogether 41 mines in the Great Belt, but two aircraft were lost during the operation.
Sgt. Richard, in Wellington Mk.III Z1615 from No. 9 Squadron (WS-H) was the only aircraft from No. 3 Group, that didn't return from the nights mission. Like the rest of the crews from No. 9 Squadron, his job was to lay mines in Quince in the Belt of Langeland.
Wellington Z1615 had the misfortune to bump into ‘L%FCtzow’. On the 10th of May, the ‘L%FCtzow’ was declaired operational, when it lay just outside of Swinem%FCnde. Four days later, it received orders to run to Norway, and the on the 15th it met with Sperrbrecher 13 and the escort force, which consisted of F1, Z29 and ‘Richard Beitzen’, north of Hiddensee. The escort was to lead the Panzerschiff up through the Great Belt to Norway. During the night, ‘L%FCtzow’ sailed up through the Belt of Langeland, when it suddenly spotted enemy aircraft approaching. The anti-aircraft artillery on the escorting ships, which sailed behind the ‘L%FCtzow’, opened fire first, but it was the 2 cm anti-aircraft guns from ‘L%FCtzow’ that shot the Wellington Z1615 down, as Sgt. Richard passed the ship at a low altitude.
Sgt. Richards was capable of making an emergency landing on Mal%F8 Grundet, outside of Nakskov Fjord. The aircraft, which was on fire at the time of the emergency landing, was badly damaged during the emergency landing, and a German crew from Wache 6 found Sgt. Gruchy in the wreck. He was the front gunner and had been killed by a shot in the head. He is buried in Svin%F8 cemetary.
Sgt. Richards, P/O Simpson, Sgt. Bell and Sgt. Gaum were saved by a Danish fisherman and brought to Nakskov, where the Danish police took them over and transported them to the hospital in Nakskov. The German Wehrmacht later picked up the crew and moved them to a prison camp in Germany. The aircraft was also shot at by Wache 6, who fired 25 tracer rounds and of course the guard tried to get credit for having shot the Wellington down. This credit was, however awarded the ‘L%FCtzow’.
During the mine-laying, all of the lighthouses in the Great Belt were turned off, but as soon as the allied aircraft disappeared, the lights went on again. ‘L%FCtzow’ continued north and at 08.45 hours, it was met by its own fighter escort over Kattegat. Due to a communication defect between the navy and the Luftwaffe, the ‘L%FCtzow’ first received the message about its own fighter escort after they already had arrived over the ship.
A number of problems occurred between the navy and the Luftwaffe. The fighters stayed over the ship for only 45 minutes before they disappeared again, and first at 12.35 hours, did they appear over the ship again. Again, it happened without being announced.
No. 9 Squadron
No, 9 Squadron sent altogether 6 Wellingtons, all of which were to drop mines in the southern part of the Great Belt. All of the 6 aircraft brought high-explosive bombs with them. These were allowed to be dropped on mititary targets.
Sgt. Dwen in Wellington X3606 (WS-M), dropped the mines as ordered, but brought two 500 lb bombs with him back to England, as he could not find a suitable target.
Sgt. Langton, in X3409 (WS-W), dropped his mines also as ordered, but he had dropped his bombs on ‘landing lights’ on Fan%F8. It was not landing lights that Langton attacked, but he was fortunate at hitting a military target anyway. The bombs hit close to searchlight position ‘Dora’ and cut off the electrical supply to all of the military installations on the island of Fan%F8.
F/O Cooper, in X3425 (WS-X), dropped the mines, but took the bombs back to England on account of a lack of targets.
P/O Casey, in X3065 (WS-N) dropped the mines as ordered and dropped his bomb load in the water off Bl%E5vand, where he tried to hit a light out on the sea. The light was probably from a fishing boat, but there were no reports of any boats having been sunk.
F/O Hodges, in X3394 (WS-G), dropped the mines as ordered, and on his way back, he dropped his bomb load on a small ship off Ribe. The bombs did not hit their target.
No. 57 Squadron
No. 57 Squadron dispatched altogether 8 Wellingtons to Quinces, all of which returned. S/Ldr Franks, in Wellington BJ677 lay mines as ordered and dropped three 500 lb bombs on ships near the southern tip of Langeland, of which one of the bombs was seen detonating. Lei. Flakzug Langeland fired 19 rounds 2 cm at the mine-laying aircraft.
F/Sgt. Anderson, in X3696, returned early because of the wrong trimming of the aircraft. He brought the load of mines and bombs back with him to England. Sgt. Brown, in X3653 and W/O Vanexan, in X3608, dropped the mines, but brought their bombs with them back to England.
P/O Austin, in X3402, had problems with the bomb suspension. When he was above the area, where he was to drop his mines, he dropped both a mine and a bomb, after which he returned to England with two bombs and one mine.
Sgt. Hudson, in X3371, dropped the mines as ordered and dropped his bomb load, consisting of three 500 lb bombs in the direction of the 1 km long bridge over Little Belt. The bombs detonated south of the bridge without causing any damage.
P/O Trant, in X3758, dropped his mines approximately 5500 meter south of the southern tip of Langeland. It wasn't really intended to lay mines here, but at first the mines could not be dropped. Then they opened the bomb hatches again and tried yet another time. When the bomb hatches opened for the second time, the mines fell out by themselves. The bomb load was dropped on what was presumed to be oil tanks on the southeastern part of Als. The bombs landed near Lysabild, about 15 km east of S%F8nderborg. The oil tanks were actually tanks at a dairy. They received no damages.
F/Sgt. Dickson, in Wellington III X3746, dropped the mines, after which he attacked the bridge over Alssund with two 500 lb bombs. The bombs shattered a large number of windows in the town of S%F8nderborg. One of the bombs hit on the Als side, the other on the Sundeved side, where a repair shed was completely destroyed, and a railroad track was torn up. No one was hurt.
No. 75 Squadron
No. 75 Squadron sent 8 Wellingtons, of which 7 dropped their mines as ordered. The seven Wellingtons were:
Wellington X3786 A S/Ldr Newton
Wellington Z1570 B F/Lt Ball
Wellington X3720 U P/P Leggate
Wellington X3468 H F/Sgt. McPhail
Wellington X3408 Q Sgt. Turner
Wellington X3751 P P/O Jarman
Wellington X3482 J F/Sgt. Fraser
One Wellington, Wellington X3646 (AA-M), which was flown by F/Sgt. McLachlan, had difficulties with its intercom and the crew decided to turn back. The three bombs were dropped in the sea, and the mines were brought back to England.
Sgt. Turner, S/Ldr Newton, F/Lt Ball and P/O Leggate, dropped their mines as ordered, but brought all of their bombs back with them to England on account of lack of targets.
F/Sgt. McPhail dropped his mines, and on the way back, dropped his bombs on the dam that connect the island of Sylt with Jutland. The crew reported that it was a direct hit. This observation was correct. Three high-explosive bombs detonated on Hindenburgdamm at the railway line at 20 km, where they caused slight damage. The damage was repaired by the German railway system within 24 hours.
P/O Jarman dropped his mines as ordered, and attacked a ‘stationary convoy’ at the southern tip of Langeland.
The last Wellington from No. 75 Squadron was X3482 (AA-J), which was flown by F/Sgt. Fraser. On the way back, F/Sgt. Fraser was shot down by III. Zug from 2./lei 836, and Wellington X3482 crashed at 0312 hours in the sea at the southern tip of Sylt. The crew consisted of F/Sgt. M. F. G. Fraser, F/Sgt. A. I. Smith, Sgt. J. O. H. Nichols, sgt. S. A. G. Shaw, and Sgt. N. E. Whiting. The whole crew was killed.
No. 101 Squadron
No. 101 Squadron dispatched four Wellingtons, all of which dropped their mines on the correct position in Quinces. The mine-laying occurred from an altitude of 500 feet with parachutes. All of the shutes were seen to open.
The aircraft were:
Wellington SR-Z Sgt. Early
Wellington SR-F F/Lt Harper
Wellington SR-S Sgt. Diemor
Wellington SR-G Sgt. Atwood
During the night, anti-aircraft artillery shot at the mine-laying aircraft from different positions across Denmark. They fired:
1./M.Fla.A. 204 120 rounds 2 cm
3./F.Fla.A. 204 6 rounds 8,8 cm
1./503 16 rounds 8,8 cm
121 rounds 2 cm
28 rounds machinegun
without hitting. At Gedser, the guard fired 45 rounds 2 cm, which the British aircraft answered. Ships from HSFL Kopenhagen shot at the mine-laying planes with 40 rounds 2 cm and the planesanswered the fire here as well.
Lancasters on a gardening operation
No. 44 Squadron dispatched three Lancasters to Yew Tree (west of L%E6s%F8 in the Kattegat). F/Lt. Barlow, DFC, in Lancaster L7541 (KM-U) had to return over the North Sea without completing the mission. Two minutes after the start, the outer left engine began to create problems, and Barlow decided to return to Waddington after dropping the mines safe over the North Sea.
W/O Osborne, in Lancaster R5508 (KM-B) dropped the mines in the prescribed area without difficulty. W/O Wright, in Lancaster L7581 (KM-R) also dropped the mines in Yew Tree, but his aircraft was shot at over Frederikshavn. The rear gunner, F/Sgt. Gill, answered the fire, and the crew believed that they had silenced a light anti-aircraft artillery position.
W/O Stott, DFM, in Lancaster R5515 (KM-A) was supposed to drop the mines in Pumpkin (northerly part of the Great Belt), but due to fog in the area, he decided to drop the mines in Hawthorn (Horns Rev). W/O Stott landed at RAF Mildenhall upon his return to England.
No. 207 Squadron dispatched two Lancasters, with the mine-laying area Asparagus (the Great Belt north of Langeland) as their target. F/Lt. Pattinson, in Lancaster R5500 (EM-B) had technical problems and dropped his mines at Horns Rev instead.
His colleague, F/O Leland, in Lancaster R5507 (EM-W) dropped the mines in the prescribed area, but on his way back, a bit south of Grindsted, he was attacked by a Bf 110. The gunners, Sgt. Whiting and Preston, answered the fire and the Bf 110 broke off the attack at a distance of around 150 metres, and disappeared to the right at the same time that F/O Leland made a steep dive to the right. The weather was very clear with northerne lights and beginning dawn, but Leland chose to continue and lay the mines. He succeeded in evading night fighters by flying at a low altitude on his way back to England. The Lancaster landed in RAF Bottesford with damages on the left wing between the two engines, as well as a a fueltank full of holes.
Hampden on a gardening operation
No. 420 Squadron dispatched three Hampdens to ‘Pumkin’, which was a mine-laying area in the northern part of the Great Belt, as well as the way out of the Great Belt. All three aircraft completed the operation and returned to RAF Waddington.
No. 408 Squadron sent 13 Hampdens, of which two did not return.
Hampden AE439 P/O Walton
Hampden AD968 Sgt. Gillham
Hampden AE432 Sgt. Clothier
Hampden L4042 Sgt. Huband
Hampden AT178 P/O Parks
Hampden AT191 P/O Charlton
Hampden AE197 P/O Williams
Hampden AT220 P/O Coulter
Hampden AE227 Sgt. Johnstone
Hampden AD870 P/O Sanderson
Hampden AT143 Sgt. Oliver
Hampden AD803 Sgt. Copeman
Hampden AT224 F/Sgt. Dilloon
P/O Walton dropped his mines as ordered and dropped two 250 lb GP bombs on a trawler or mine sweeper just south of Bl%E5vand. The bombs were dropped from an altitude of just 2000 feet.
Sgt. Gillham was unable to reach ‘Pumkin’ and dropped his mines off Horns Rev instead. Sgt. Clothier, P/O Charlton, P/O Williams, P/O Coulter, Sgt. Johnstone and Sgt. Huband dropped their mines in the prescribed area and returned with their bomb load, as they were not able to find a suitable target.
P/O Parks dropped the mines in Pumkin and his bomb load, consisting of two 250 lb GP, on the western side of Fan%F8, where he thought he saw a lighted runway for sea planes. The high-explosive bombs landed in Melbjerg plantation, west of Nordby on Fan%F8.
P/O Sanderson had difficulty finding ‘Pumkin’ and dropped his mines at Horns Rev instead. This was after they had found Bl%E5vand from where Sanderson flew a ‘timed run’. The bombs were dropped over the North Sea in order to economize on fuel on the way home. A large number of aircraft from No. 408 Squadron were redirected upon arriving in England, and landed on different air fields.
Sgt. Oliver dropped his mines in ‘Pumkin’ after having found R%F8sn%E6s from where he made a ‘timed run’. After the mines were laid, Sgt. Oliver ascended to an altitude of 8000 feet, after which he began to look for a suitable target. He dropped the bombs on a small ship west of Sams%F8. The ship was a German mine-sweeper, and according to Danish eyewitnesses, Sgt. Oliver hit the mine-sweeper. A bomb hit the German ship, but just glanced off without detonating, which could mean it was dud.
The German mine-sweeper was an expensive acquaintance for No. 408 Squadron, as the last two aircraft from the squadron were shot down by this ship. Hampden Mk. I AT224 (EQ-A) was hit at 01.53 hours. It exploded in the air and, burning, crashed into the sea west of Sams%F8. The entire crew, consisting of F/Sgt. J. Dillon, Sgt. R. Dreyer, P/O C. Cresswell and Sgt. W. Palmer, were killed.
Hampden Mk. I AD803 (EQ-L) were shot down in flames a short time after, but this time there was a survivor. The pilot, Sgt. H. Copemann, who survived the crash, was fished up by Danes and surrendered to the German Wehrmacht. Copemann was on his 13th mission. The rest of the crew, F/Sgt. A. Smith, Sgt. N. W. Smith and F/Sgt. W. F. Millerd, were killed.
During the day of the 16th of May, Coastal Command realised, that the two German navy operations were in process simultaneously, one of which was the movement of ‘Prinz Eugen’ with four destroyers. The German cruiser was discovered by a PRU Spitfire, which had started from Scotland at 14.51 hours in order to fly a photo mission (5/66) over Norway. At 16.30 hours, the pilot, F/Lt. Merrifield, discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ just off Trondheim on a south westerly course in the company of two destroyers.
At 1100 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ had left the anchorage in Trondheim to slip off to Kiel. This operation was called ‘Unternehmen Zauberfl%F6te’ by the Germans. At 14.50 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ met with the destroyers, ‘Paul Jacobi’ and Z25, as well as the torpedo boats T11 and T12. At 15.26 hours, four escorting Bf 109's arrived over the naval force, which sailed along Norways coast. At 15.48 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ managed to come up to 26 knobs, but 10 minutes later, the cruiser had problems with its rudder, and had to switch over to using the manual rudder. All the way to Kiel, they had to use muscle power for altering their course.
‘Prinz Eugen’ was escorted by the Luftwaffe until 22.55 hours, but because of the darkness, the escorting fighters (Bf 109's from I./JG 5) left the naval force. At 23.20 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ passed Stadlandet and continued southwards close to the Norwegian coast.
The other operation was ‘Unternehmen Walzertraum’ - ‘L%FCtzow's transfer to Norway. The British realized now, that ‘L%FCtzow’ was on its way through Danish waters, escorted by four destroyers and a torpedo boat. At 11.45 hours, a PRU aircraft discovered the naval force on its way north in the Kattegat, sailing at an estimated speed of 15 knots. The crew on board the ‘L%FCtzow’ was well aware that it had been discovered. At 11.58 hours, the ships monitoring service picked up the report from the British aircraft. ‘L%FCtzow's’ fighter escort arrived over the ship 37 minutes later. An escort, that the German navy had been promised, was to be continuous and completely protective!
At 1300 hours, a air raid alarm was sounded on board the ‘L%FCtzow’ as an unknown aircraft passed on the port side of the ship at a distance of 1500 metres. The unknown aircraft was shot at by the anti-aircraft artillery, without it having given the signal of the day . The aircraft sent some blinking signals, but nothing that was understood.
During the 16th of May the ‘L%FCtzow’ sailed slowly up through Kattegat with Z29 in front, Z27 and F1 portside and ‘Richard Beitzen’ and ‘Hans Lody’ starboard. At 1450 hours, Gruppe Nord ordered the ‘L%FCtzow’ and its escort to turn around, after which ‘L%FCtzow’ turned portside and changed its course.
At 1549 hours, ‘Richard Beitzen’ had contact with a submarine and dropped several depth charges. ‘L%FCtzow’ immediately increased its speed and sailed its escort astern. Within just a few more minutes, another report from Gruppe Nord came in. At 20.00 hours, ‘L%FCtzow’ was again to set its course to the north, and at 04.00 hours was to appear at Kvarensfjord near Kristiansand.
‘Richard Beitzen’ still had submarine contact, and dropped depth charges again at 16.12 hours. The German destroyer didn't have any luck with its submarine hunt, and they left the Vorpostenboot V909 at the spot, after which Richard Beitzen again joined ‘L%FCtzow’ at 18.06 hours.
At 1615 hours, the look out personnel on the ‘L%FCtzow’, saw an unknown aircraft at 4000 metres over the ship. ‘L%FCtzow’ opened fire again and took the British aircraft under heavy fire. However, they did not manage to shoot down the aircraft, which took up a position out of the range of the anti-aircraft artillery, and continued to shadow the ‘L%FCtzow’. Luftwaffe shined by its absence.
The British crew reported that the ‘L%FCtzow’ had turned around at 16.25 hours. The British recce over Skagerrak functioned well. At 20.15 hours, ‘L%FCtzow’ turned its course towards the north yet again. and already at 20.20 hours, the message of the change of course was received back at Coastal Command.
Skagerrak was crossed at high speed, and at 23.25 hours, the German naval force changed its course towards west southwest. At 05.15 hours, ‘L%FCtzow’ arrived at Kvarensfjord, where it was anchored. Kvarensfjord is a small fjord, where it would be almost impossible to carry out a torpedo attack, and between the cliffs, the German ship would be difficult to find. On the 17th of May, the four destroyers were ordered to participate in ‘Unternehmen Burgund’, which was a reinforcement of Westwall mine barrage in Skagerrak.
Due to poor communication, the Coastal Command headquarters was first informed of ‘Prinz Eugen’ at 1950 hours, that is, after the recce aircraft had landed. The report of ‘Prinz Eugen’ triggered off quite a bustle, and during the evening, No. 86 Squadron was readied for a torpedo attack.
At first, at 23.30 hours, 6 Beauforts from Sumburgh, were sent out, and at 01.20 hours, 9 Beauforts from Wick. Both of these formations consisted of aircraft from No. 86 Squadron. None of the aircraft that were sent out discovered the ‘Prinz Eugen’, and they landed again between 0353 and 0515 hours. The British torpedo aircraft had actually been very close to ‘Prinz Eugen’. At 0058 hours, air raid alarm was sounded on board the ‘Prinz Eugen’, when they observed four low-flying aircraft on a course of 150 by 220 degrees. The heavy artillery was made ready for barrage fire. The artillery was ready to open fire in the area 3,100 - 1,900 metres, but the British aircraft didn't notice the cruiser, which had been sailing at low speed to avoid making noticable waves (?).
At 0030 hours, two Hudsons were sent to carry out a recce along the west coast of Norway. Neither of these crews found ‘Prinz Eugen’.
At 02.00 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ passed Faa Fjord, south of M%E5loy, and at 04.00 hours Hellefjorden. During the next hour, the German squadron held itself near land, before coming out in more open waters again. It was difficult to maneouver ‘Prinz Eugen’ in the narrow fjord, but the fjord gave protection agains torpedo attack, and the Coastal Command probably didn't calculate that the Germans would seek that way down the coast.
At 0504 hours, there was again a fighter escort over ‘Prinz Eugen’. The escort consisted of 4 Bf 109 from I./JG 5. As of 0600 hours, when they passed Aafjord, they increased speed up to 20 knots at first, and later to 26 knots. At 08.38 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ had engine problems, and the speed was then decreased.
At 23.23 hours, 6 Hampdens were sent to lay mines in Haugesund, where it was assumed that the ‘Prinz Eugen’ would pass by. At 11.25 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ received a message that Karmansund was blocked. Kamransund is the southern part of Haugesund. ‘Prinz Eugen’ sailed into the Hardanger Fjord and dropped its anker.
During the night, Bomber Command again dropped mines in the Belt of Langeland and Kieler Bight, but because of bad weather conditions over the bomber bases in England, only 7 Lancasters and 7 Manchesters from No. 5 Group were dispatched. They all returned from the nights operations. The German navy in Denmark registered 10 approaching mine-laying aircraft, and sent out a mine warning for the northerne part of Lilleb%E6lt, Storeb%E6lt, the shipping route Gedser-Warnem%FCnde, as well as the western part of the Baltic Sea.
At 0809 hours, the mine sweeper M1903 cleared a mine southeast of Spodsbjerg on Langeland , but during this operation, the Norwegian freighter ‘Gudrid’ ran ground and started to leak water. ‘Gudrid’ (3000 BRT) was loaded w%EDth iron ore and was on its way to Germany to be taken over by the German shipping-company, Slomann, in Hamburg.
During the night, Luftwaffe had registered two courier flights over Skagerrak. One was on its way to Sweden and the other to Scotland. Moreover, several reconnaissance aircraft were discovered over Skagerrak and Kattegat. At 0735 hours, a British reconnaissance aircraft came in over Jutland, after it had been discovered by the German early warning at a position 20 km northwest of Hirtshals. The early warning followed the aircrafts course up to 30 km northeast of Randers, after which it turned around with a westerly course over Viborg. The last report was sent at 0819 hours from the radar station ’Ringelnatter’ northwest of Ringk%F8bing, and at that time, the aircraft was 30 km northwest of Ringk%F8bing. The German fighters took of to intercept the reconnaissance plane, but got no contact.
In order to intercept ‘L%FCtzow’ on its northerly course, a Hudson was sent at 02.30 hours on an extended South Stand recce flight, followed by a Beaufighter, flying a regular South Stand, at 03.15 hours. Neither of these two aircraft found either the ‘Prinz Eugen’ or the ‘L%FCtzow’.
Coastal Command was quite sure that the ‘Prinz Eugen’ was on its way to Germany, but just to be on the safe side, they sent a PRU Spitfire to Trondheim at 0632 hours, to check and see if the Tirpitz also had sailed. Tirpitz was in its customary position, and the PRU observed another cruiser in Lofjord as well.
Coastal Command was worried that the Beauforts they had sent out, hadn't found the ‘Prinz Eugen’. The reason for this could have been that ‘Prinz Eugen’ had taken refuge in a fjord, or that the ship was much further south than originally believed. Therefore, it was decided to move the recce further south. At 06.41 hours, a Beaufighter was sent from Sumburgh, to fly down alont the Norwegian coast. At 07.06 hours, it was followed by two more Beaufighters, which also carried out a recce along the Norwegian coast. The three aircraft had the assignment of patrolling from north of Stadtlandet to Bergen in the south. The first Beaufighter that had been sent, returned without result. The last two Beaufighters sent out, didn't discover the ‘Prinz Eugen’ either, but instead, found a submarine, which made a emergency dive at position 6058N 0252E. All three aircraft landed between 09.13 and 09.28 hours.
At almost the same time, at 0915 hours, a telefon report came in to the commander of Coastal Command, that ‘Prinz Eugen’ at 03.20 hours GMT was at position 6124N0503E. This information probably came from Ultra, but the source wasn't explicitly defined.
At 09.00 hours, another PRU Spitfire was sent out. It came back with the same result as the aircraft that had been sent out 0632 hours.
At 10.15 hours, a PRU Mosquito from RAF Leuchars, started out to cover the area from Lista to Bergen. At 1200 hours, the crew reported that they had discovered a pocket battleship in Bommel Fjord (5940N0523E) on a course 045 and 15 knots. The Mosquito took pictures of the ship, and after returning, it was established (after the pictures were developed) at 1530 hours, that it was not a pocket battleship, but ‘Prinz Eugen’. At almost the same moment as the Mosquito, a Beaufighter from Sunburgh, also found ‘Prinz Eugen’. The position was 5 miles from the other position, but the time difference could easily fit the disagreement of the position.
The crew on board the ‘Prinz Eugen’ were very much aware that ‘them from the other field post number’ had again found the ship. At 12.26 hours, the ships monitoring service (B-Dienst) intercepted the British position report.
At 1245 hours, Karmansund was declared free of mines, and the movement south was resumed with high speed. At 1405 hours, one of ‘Prinz Eugen's’ Ar 196s took off. Forty minutes later, ’Prinz Eugen’ was at Haugesund and the speed was reduced untill 1558 hours. At that time, the cruiser's second Ar 196 took off in order to fly a submarine recce after which it had to fly to Stavanger for refueling.
In the mean time, at 1533 hours, air raid alarms were sounded. ‘Prinz Eugen’ fired illumination shells to show the direction of the enemy aircraft for the escorting German fighters, which at the same time were in radio contact with the cruiser.
A PRU Spitfire, which was dispatched at 14.02 hours to patrol the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Stadtlandet, didn't observe the German fleet. On the other hand, a Mosquito, that had started from Leuchars to cover the coast from Stavanger to Bergen, did observe it. At 1540, it discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ at position 5912N 0522E in a southerly direction, and estimated the speed as 20 knots. The Mosquito crew didn't send the position right away, but continued up along the Norwegian coast according to instruction. Their orders were to complete the entire patrol flight, because it could be expected that ‘L%FCtzow’ had managed to arrive at that area. After the Mosquito had completed the recce, it continued 50 miles out over the sea, before the crew sent their report. The report was intercepted by No. 18 Group at 16.35 hours - 55 minutes after the observation. This delay in the reporting system was the first serious mistake in a long series of events.
At 16.00 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ had passed Feiestein Rinne and when the Mosquito sent its report at 16.35 hours, it was immediately intercepted by ‘Prinz Eugen's’ monitoring service.
At 16.53 hours, a report about the observation of ‘Prinz Eugen’ at position 5611N 0521E was telephoned in to Wick. The station commander was inormed that the observation was carried out at 1540 hours, and that he could expect the ship would be off Lista at 19.30 hours. The duty officer called the crews over the loudspeaker system, and the flight crews, which were on one hour alert, left their mess halls in order to gather in the briefing room. The Hudson crews from No. 48 and 608 Squadrons were told to get ready to start as quickly as possible.
At 1705 hours, the commander of No. 86 Squadron was informed, that his aircraft was to be in the air at 17.45 hours. At the same time, it was decided that a Beaufighter was to fly a Stand Patrol. This aircraft, Beaufighter LA-X, flown by F/O Ourer from No. 235 Squadron, was in the air at 17.19 hours, and at 18.48 hours, it observed four coastal vessels, each at around 500 tons, off the Norwegian west coast. The ships sailed in a line with a course towards the south. Four minutes later, two grey ships, around 600 tons, were observed on a northerly course. F/O Ourer set his course towards south, and a couple of minuteslater, he discovered a one-engine fighter at a distance of three kilometres. The aircraft flew at 1000 feet, while the Beaufighter was only at an altitude of 100 feet. The German fighter went after the Beaufighter, but broke off the pursuit again, after just a couple of minutes flying. At 19.06 hours, ‘one large naval unit with 4 escort vessels’ was observed. F/O Ourer flew closer to the German naval formation and took pictures of the largest of the vessels. The Beaufighter crew could see two Bf 109s circling over the naval formation at 1000 feet in altitude, and one of the fighters took up chase of the Beaufighter, which sought out over the sea at only 100 feet in altitude with maximum speed. It managed to shake off the German fighter, and F/O Ourer went up to 4000 feet, where he tried to send a message til 18 Group at 19.20 hours. He was, however, not able to get in contact with 18 Group at 6000 kcs, and instead got contact with Wick at 3215 kcs, which sent the report further to 18 Group. Due to the amount of time used to send the report, Ourer estimated that he didn't have sufficient fuel to fly back to ‘Prinz Eugen’ again. Instead, hed set his course back to Scotland, where he landed on Leuchars at 20.56 hours.
The report of ‘Prinz Eugen's’ position triggered off a lot of activity in 18 Group, but a serious mistake was made. The position was given as 5830N 0535E, which was incorrect. The position indicated was 21 km too far north, and this was to have catastrophic consequences for No. 86 Squadron. The mistake was amplified by the signal officer from No. 18 Group. He repeated the report to the torpedo aircraft, who at that moment already were in the air, on their way to the target. Here, he made a serious mistake. He gave the dispatching time, 10.45 hours, as the observation time, and not 19.06 hours, which it really should have been. In this way, he amplified Ourers mistake.
At the same time that F/O Ourer was ordered to take off from Wick, a similar order was sent to Sumburgh, where from Beaufighter LA-F from No. 235 Squadron started at 17.40 hours to fly a patrol sortie along the Norwegian west coast. At 21.05 hours, the aircraft landed again at RAF Acklington, without having found the ‘Prinz Eugen’. Upon returning, it was ascertained that the aircraft's drift sight was out of order, and that there was a 20 degree difference between the pilots and the observors compasses.
At Wick, the station commander contacted by telephone at 17.05 hours - at the same time the torpedo aircraft from No. 86 Squadron were ordered to get ready - A.O-C.-in-C. Coastal Command, and informed him that the Hudson aircraft would be in the air at 17.30 hours, and that the Beaufort aircraft would be on their way at 17.45 hours. These times were later corrected to a quarter of an hour later for both forces.
Ten minutes later, AOC and the station commander were again in contact by telephone and AOC agreed with the station commander that it was best to send the Hudson aircraft individually, with as short a time interval as possible.
The approach at high altitude was carried out to give the bombs sufficient penetration when they hit the cruisers's armoured deck, as well as to lure the German fighters away from the torpedo aircraft. The plan didn't work after its intention. The German fighters ignored the high-flying aircraft, for the most part, and concentrated instead on the much more dangerous torpedo aircraft. The Hudson aircraft carried four 250 lb SAP, which needed a high altitude if the bombs were to destroy ‘Prinz Eugen's’ deck. On the other hand, it was practically impossible to hit a naval ship from such a high altitude, when the ship carried out evasive maneouvers.
The Hudson crews had been briefed during the afternoon, and they had been informed that the weather over southern Norway was clear with good visibility. If they were able to get the target in the bomb sight, then they were to attack it, but they must not remain over the target area. Their assignment was to confuse the German flak crews, and get them to open fire. The Hudson aircraft would not have a chance against fighter aircraft without protection from the clouds.
During the conversation between the station commander and AOC, the latter expressed the wish, that a part of the Hudson force be held back for a short time, so it would be possible to stretch the attacks by the Hudson aircraft, in case the Beaufort aircraft from No. 42 Squadron were delayed in their start from Leuchars. The station commander pointed out that the main part of the Hudson crews had already left the briefing room, but they mananged to hold three crews back, of which two already were sitting in a truck and waiting to be driven out to their aircraft. Their departure was postponed by about 30 minutes.
Hudson from No. 48 Squadron (OY-) and No. 608 Squadron (UL-) started in a judicious blend from Wick, and set course towards Norway.
The following aircraft started in the first wave:
Aircraft Pilot Starting time
Hudson OY-P P/O Johansen 17.40
Hudson OY-R P/O Paisley 17.40
Hudson UL-R P/O Austin 17.40
Hudson UL-O P/O Smith 17.47
Hudson UL-H P/O Sehslefield 17.54
Hudson OY-T P/O Ellison 17.55
Hudson UL-A P/O Walensley 17.58
Hudson UL-M P/O Walker 17.59
Hudson UL-U P/O Keeble 18.00
At 1745 hours, the station commander telephoned AOC again, in order to find out when the torpedo aircraft from Leuchars would be over the target area. AOC expected that No. 42 Squadron would carry out their attack around 20.30 hours, after which the station commander dispatched:
Hudson OY-A P/O Bennett 18.19
Hudson UL-G Sgt Hanson 18.19
Hudson UL-K P/O Lovelace 18.23
18 Group had decided that the torpedo aircraft would operate in two seperate formations. The first consisted of 15 Beauforts from No. 86 Squadron, which had started from Wich at 17.51 hours, so they could be over the target at 20.10 hours. The next force, consisted of 12 Beaufrots from No. 42 Squadron, which were to fly from a position 15 miles south of Lister and towards the north, until they reached ‘Prinz Eugen’. With a little luck, they would be able to attack the target at almost the same time. Both torpedo forces were reinforced by Beaufighter escorts and No. 42 Squadron had 6 Blenheims to help as well.
No. 86 Squadron, starting from Wick, was under the command of S/Ldr Jimmy Hyde, an experienced Australian torpedo pilot, who had previously attacked heavy German surface units.
The aircraft from No. 86 Squadron were:
Aircraft Code Serial Pilot Starting time
Beaufort BX-G AW355 S/Ldr Hyde 1751
Beaufort BX-B AW296 P/O Roper 1752
Beaufort BX-K AW349 F/Sgt Boote 1756
Beaufort BX-V AW284 F/Sgt Atkinson 1758
Beaufort BX-T AW382 F/Lt Firmin 1759
Beaufort BX-S AW347 Sgt Brockhouse 1802
Beaufort BX-W AW367 P/O Esler 1800
Beaufort BX-Z AW356 F/Sgt Thompsion 1801
Beaufort BX-A AW345 F/Lt Brice 1803
Beaufort BX-L AW293 F/Sgt Hurrell 1805
Beaufort BX-F AW341 Sgt Daly 1806
Beaufort BX-M AW302 W/O Brown 1804
Beaufort BX-D DD870 F/O Kellow 1807
Beaufort BX-E AW251 Sgt Ford 1809
Beaufort BX-U AT248 Sgt Angelo 1809
Four Beaufighters from No. 235 and 248 Squadron were ordered to fly as escort for No. 86 Squadron. The four Beaufighters were a bit faster than the Beaufort aircraft and took off last. They were:
Aircraft Code Squadron Starting time
Beaufighter LA-W No. 235 Squadron 1809
Beaufighter LA-G No. 235 Squadron 1812
Beaufighter WR-J No. 248 Squadron 1811
Beaufighter WR- C No. 248 Squadron 1812
The Beaufort and Beaufighter crews had previously been thoroughly briefed that the Beauforts were to fly in sections of four, with the sections in ‘line astern’ at a distance of 500 yards between the sections. The torpedo aircraft were to carry out approaches as low as possible, while the Beaufighters were to fly a little higher and carry out screening, when the leader of the Beaufort formation signalled that he went into an attack. During the afternoon, the station commander (commander?) of Wick had briefed S/Ldr. Hyde that ‘Prinz Eugen’ might pass between Eger%F6 and Lista in the afternoon. At 1700 hours, they were of the opinion that ‘Prinz Eugen’ and its escort would have passed Eger%F6 around 20.00 hours, but the uncertainty of the position depended on the speed of ‘Prinz Eugen’. Therefore, it was decided to cross the Norwegian coast north of Eger%F6, and from here, fly towards the south. The visibility in the area around Eger%F6 was good - one could see at least 30 km
Due to the incorrect reports regarding position from 18 Group, S/Ldr Hyde didn't turn towards the south, but instead set course towards the north. After around five minutes flying, the British formation could see, that there were no targets towards the north, after which S/Ldr. Hyde again turned the formation towards the south. At that moment, the Luftwaffe attacked!
Meanwhile, the force from Leuchars was also in the air. Twelve Beauforts from No. 42 Squadron started in two sections under the leadership of Wing Commander M. F. D. Williams, who was an experienced torpedo pilot with years of experience in Swordfishs. Williams had taken over the squadron in January, 1942. The leader of the other section was a ‘chubby cheery New Zealander’ by the name of Johnny Dinsdale.
Type Code Serial Pilot Starting time
Beaufort AW-Y AW375 W/C Willims 1750
Beaufort AW-J AW360 P/O Oughton 1751
Beaufort AW-F AW288 P/O McKern 1752
Beaufort AW-V AW383 F/O Archer 1753
Beaufort AW-D AW315 F/Sgt Manning 1754
Beaufort AW-N AW373 F/O Birchley 1754
Beaufort AW-C AW381 F/O Kerr 1755
Beaufort AW-K AW307 S/Ldr Dinsdale 1756
Beaufort AW-B AW350 F/Sgt Nichol 1756
Beaufort AW-S AW384 F/Lt Pett 1756
Beaufort AW-T AW274 Sgt Whiteside 1758
Beaufort AW-H AW 362 P/O Dewhurst 1758
The Beaufort formation was followed by six Blenheims from No. 404 Squadron:
Type Code Serial Pilot Starting time
Blenheim EE-M M6035 W/Cdr Woodruff 1800
Blenheim EE-R V5729 W/O Bell 1800
Blenheim EE-O T1869 F/Sgt Butler 1801
Blenheim EE-P Z5747 S/Ldr McHardy 1801
Blenheim EE-L V5765 F/Lt McCutchson 1804
Blenheim EE-K N3600 W/O Bolli 1804
The Blenheim crews had orders to fly dummy torpedo attacks further the the left or right of the Beaufort formations, and by this, attract the anti-aircraft fire from the ships. They were also to function as fighters in case the the German ships had fighter escorts. Blenheim Mk. IV was not exactly the most suitable aircraft for this assignment, and most of the crew members probably had second thoughts about this task, but they all did their duty, even though the chances of survival weren't great.
Four beaufighters from No. 235 and 248 Squadron also had the task of averting fighter attacks on No. 42 Squadron. The four Beaufighters were to simultaneously attack the German destroyers with 20 mm. machine cannons, in order to diminish the German anti-aircraft fire.
Aircraft Code Squadron Pilot Starting time
Beaufighter LA-A No. 235 Squadron W/O Saffodini 18.00
Beaufighter LA-V No. 235 Squadron P/O Jay 18.07
Beaufighter WR-Q No. 248 Squadron P/O Maurice 18.05
Beaufighter WR-T No. 248 Squadron W/O Pike 18.07
No. 86 squadron is attacked
After the take off from Wick, the Beauforts from No. 86 Squadron got into formation and continued towards the Norwegian coast together with the four escorting Beaufighters. On the way over the North Sea, the right engine on Beaufort BX-A began to have problems, and F/Lt. Brice finally had to return to Wick, where he landed with one engine at 1955 hours.
After having received the incorrect report, S/Ldr. Hyde set course towards the north, up along the coast, before he again turned the formation towards the south. At that moment, several of the Hudson aircraft discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ and its escort, but the different formations operated on different frequencies, and did not have orders to report to each other.
The high-flying Hudsons were discovered in good time byt the German early warning system and the Bf 109s from I./JG 5 took off from Stavanger. During the start from Stavanger, Feldwebel Josef Reitlinger crashed and was killed. I./JG 5 was formed on the 25th of Januar, 1942, at Stavanger, and normally 3./JG 5 was stationed at Herdla, while 1. and 2. Staffel lay at Stavanger and Lister respectively. Smaller detachments also lay at the three air fields, Trondheim, Kristiansand and Mandal at different times.
At 1955 hours, the Bf 109s got into contact with No. 86 Squadron. At 20.05 hours, S/Ldr. Hyde was attacked by three Bf 109s, which flew at 1000 feet. The enemy fighters flew directly into the British formation and shot at the Beauforts at a distance of 150 metres. During the air combat, the gunner on board S/Ldr. Hydes aircraft, managed to hit F/Sgt. Bootes Beaufort in the nose. F/Sgt. Boote (BX-V) had more problems during the air combat, because his electric air screw on the right engine broke, which resulted in a violent turn. During the air combat, F/Sgt. Bootes gunner shot a long volley (200 rounds) into the belly of a Bf 109. He believed that he saw smoke streaming out of the aircraft, which crashed into the sea.
The Germans had the following losses during operational sorties the 17th of May in Norway:
- I./JG 5
Emergencylanding in the sea near Stavanger due to enemy fire
Pilot rescued by Seenotdienst.
Bf 109F-2 Werk Nr. 12807 - damaged 100%
- I./JG 5
Rammed object during take off from Stavanger-Sola
The pilot, Uffz Josef Reitlinger, killed
Bf 109F-2 Werk Nr. 12661 - damaged 90%
- I./JG 5
Crashed into the Nord-Fjord due to engine problems
Pilot not wounded
Bf 109F-2 Werk Nr. 12795 - damaged 100%
- I./JG 5
Crashed due to enemy fire at Stavanger
Pilot parachuted to safety
Bf 109E-7 Werk Nr. 4029 damaged 100%
- Einsatzstaffel Jagdgr Drontheim
Crashed during landing at Stavanger-Sola
Bf 109E-7 Werk Nr. 5982 - damaged 90%
P/O Roper, in Beaufort BX-B, also demanded credit for his crew for having shot down a Bf 109. P/O Roper was altogether attacked by three Bf 109s, and he saw two Beauforts crash into the sea.
The four Beaufighters (G/235, W/235, J/248, and C/248), which functioned as fighter escort, attempted to attract the German fighter aircraft, which partially succeeded for the two aircraft from No. 235 Squadron. All four Beaufighters returned0, even though C/248 had been damaged during the air combat. S/Ldr. Hyde had only words of praise for the Beaufighter crews.
F/Sgt. Atkinson, in Beaufighter BX-V, was attacked by no less than 12 Bf 109s, and at 20.05 hours, he saw a Beaufort get shot down by anti-aircraft artillery from the Norwegean cost. After the combat, the German crews from the shore based anti-aircraft artillery claimed that they had shot down four aircraft.
During the time between 20.10 and 20.25 hours, Atkinson saw another Beaufort get shot down by a Bf 109. The Beaufort had not yet dropped its torpedo, and the aircraft exploded when it hit the sea. At 20.23 hours, F/Sgt. Atkinson saw Beaufort BX-W, flown by P/O Esler, get shot to pieces by a Bf 109, and crash into the sea with its left engine in flames. F/Sgt. Atkinson also saw a Bf 109, with smoke streaming out of the aircraft, crash into the sea.
F/Lt. Firmin, who had flown Beaufort BX-T, dropped his torpedo during the air combat, so he could keep in formation. At 20.28 hours, he claimed that his gunner had shot down a Bf 109, whose wing hit the sea.
F/Sgt. Thompson, on board BX-Z, supported F/Lt. Firmins claim of credit for having shot down a Bf 109. Thompson saw two Bf 109s get shot down and claimed credit for his gunner for having damaged a Bf 109. Beaufort BX-Z was not damaged.
Sgt. Brockhouse saw around twenty Bf 109s attack the Beaufort formation, and reported upon arrival back in Scotland, that the German fighters attacked from all directions, except from the front. Sgt. Brockhouse dropped his torpedo after his aircraft was damaged under the combat. Brockhouse thought that his aircraft shot down a Bf 109, and upon returning home, his crew reported, that they had seen altogether five aircraft crash, namely two Beauforts and three Bf 109s.
At 19.55 hours, Sgt. Daly in BX-F, discovered three Bf 109s, which were crossing over the Beaufort formation, without attacking. Ten minutes later, at least 16 Bf 109s attacked, and Sgt. Daly saw the front gunner on board F/O Kellos aircraft, fire a burst, which hit one of the attacking aircraft. The Bf 109 crashed into the sea with black smoke streaming out from the engine. At 20.20 hours, Sgt. Daly saw that a Bf 109 attacked F/Sgt. Hurrells BX-L from the port side. F/Sgt. Hurrells aircraft lost altitude, and was broken to pieces as it hit the sea. Sgt. Daly tried to help F/Sgt. Hurrell during the attack, and the rear gunner on board Dalys aircraft fired an 8 second burst into the German fighter, after which the German pilot broke off the attack. The rear gunner fired again, a 3 second burst this time, at the German aircraft, and Sgt. Daly saw the Bf 109 crash into the sea. Sgt. Daly believed that 2 Beaforts and 5 Bf 109s were shot down during the air combats.
W/O Brown flew BX-M, and his gunner counted fifteen Bf 109s attacking the Beaufort formation. Browns cres saw two Bf 109s and three Beauforts get shot down.
F/O Kellow, on board BX-D, had major difficulties during the attack. Early in the attack, Kellow asserted that his gunner shot down a Bf 109 around 200 metres from the coast. At 20.15 hours, he was attacked by three Bf 109s, and the rear gunner shot one of these down. The rear gunner was wounded in the head, hand and leg, but remained at his place and directed Kellow during the attack of the German fighters. The telegrapher shot a Bf 109, which drew smoke after itself, as it broke away in a sharp turn. Afterwards, the wireless operator took over for the rear gunner, while the navigator gave first aid to the rear gunner. F/O Kellow landed back at Wick at 22.28 hours with a perforated aircraft.
The four other crews were not so fortunate. They were all shot down during the attack, namely:
Beaufort BX-W AW367 P/O Esler
Beaufort BX-L AW293 F/Sgt Hurrell
Beaufort BX-E AW251 Sgt Ford
Beaufort BX-U AT248 Sgt Angelo
No. 86 Squadron was fortunate that they only lost four aircraft. The circumstances can, in part, be attributed to the torpedo aircraft having been attacked by I./JG 5, which was relatively inexperienced at that particular time during the war. I./JG 5 demanded credit for definitely having shot down 18 aircraft, as well as 5 more, which could not be verified. The following crews were credited having shot down aircraft:
Oblt. Hartwein Stab/JG 5 1 Hudson & 1 Beaufort
Lt. Schmidt 1./JG 5 2 Beaufort
Ofw. Schinzel 1./JG 5 1 Beaufort
Fw. Beulig 1./JG 5 2 Beaufort
Uffz. Graupner 1./JG 5 1 Beaufort
Uffz. Heinsdorf 1./JG 5 1 Beaufort
Uffz. Kaddatz 1./JG 5 1 Beaufort
Uffz. K%E4ppler 1./JG 5 2 Beaufort
Uffz. Leitner 1./JG 5 2 Beaufort
Fw. Sch%FCtze 2./JG 5 2 Beaufort
Lt. M%FCller 3./JG 5 2 Beaufort
What happened with the German pilots later? Ofw. Schinzel, Fw. Beulig, Uffz. Heinsdorf, and Uffz. K%E4ppler survived the war and were not credited with having shot down any more aircraft. Oblt. Hartwein was killed on the 21st of August, 1942, while Lt. Schmidt was killed on the 11the of December, 1943. Uffz. Graupner was killed on the 10th of April, 1943, while Uffz. Kaddatz was killed on the 4th of the same month. Uffz. Leitner was killed on 2 February, 1944, while Fw. Sch%FCtze and Lt. M%FCller were killed on the 3rd of May, 1943 and the 17th of June, 1944 respectively.
The attack on Prinz Eugen
At 20.01 hours, the lookout post on the ‘Prinz Eugen’, observed a Hudson at high altitude, in the direction of 240 degree, after which the air raid alarm was sounded. The enemy aircraft was taken under fire with 10.5 and 3.7 cm anti-aircraft artillery, before disappearing into the clouds at a distance of 6,800 metres. The fighter control officer on board the ‘Prinz Eugen’ ordered two fighters to go after the Hudson, but the German fighters turned back to the cruiser when the British aircraft was out of sight. The Hudson was also shot at from shorebased anti-aircraft artillery.
P/O Johansen from No. 48 Squadron, was the first aircraft to attack the ‘Prinz Eugen’, as he dropped his bombs, consisting of four 250 lb SAP, already at 1950 hours. The attack was carried out from 18,000 feet, and Johansen couldn't see where the bombs landed. He saw neither the enemy fighters nor was he exposed to German flak. He landed again at 21.55 hours, which was long before all the others. The personnel on board the ‘Prinz Eugen’ did not notice the impact of the bombs.
At 20.08 hours, the first low-flying torpedo aircraft were observed in the direction of 115 degrees. At first, only a few were observed, but during the next minutes, 28 aircraft were counted. At 20.16 hours, the lookout posts on the ‘Paul Jacobi’ observed torpedoes in the water, and the destroyer fired red/green double starred illumination shells as a warning. On account of misunderstandings, a submarine alarm sounded at the same time.
The attacking Beauforts were dangerous for ‘Prinz Eugen’, as it had reduced maneouverability because of the emergency rudder, which was being worked manually. ‘Prinz Eugen’ turned first towards port, and a bit later hard towards starboard. ‘Prinz Eugen’ opened fire with four shots from B and C towers, which was the 20.3 cm main armament, after which the torpedo planes were within reach of the rest of the anti-aircraft guns. During the attack, ‘Prinz Eugen’ alone fired
20.3 cm 4 rounds
10.5 cm 361 rounds
3.7 cm 486 rounds
2 cm 2082 rounds
‘Prinz Eugen’ was heavily equipped with anti-aircraft artillery. The cruiser had twelve 10.5 cm anti-aircraft guns in six double gun carrianges. Each cannon was able to fire up to 15 shells per minute. ‘Prinz Eugen’ was altogether issued 6200 shells for the 10.5 cm flak, so it was not likely that the ship would run out of ammunition. ‘Prinz Eugen’ had twelve 3.7 cm SK C/34 anti-aircraft guns in double gun carriages. The rate of fire from these guns was around 30 rounds per barrel. There were approximately 2000 rounds for each gun on board.
The light flak consisted of eight 20 mm C/30 and five 2 cm Vierling. These anti-aircraft guns were exceedingly effective against low flying aircraft, and were commonly feared by attacing crews. Especially the Vierling was able to fire an impressive amount of rounds per second. All in all, there were around 3000 rounds per barrel on board ‘Prinz Eugen’.
The lookout posts, whose job it was to detect torpedoes in the water, reported around 30 torpedoes. Several of the torpedoes came very close to ‘Prinz Eugen’, but it managed to out manoeuver them all. Several torpedoes detonated at a distance of 200-300 metres from the cruiser, and down in the machine room, the crew experienced the explosions from the torpedoes as bombs being dropped on the ship.
- At 20.21 hours, there was a report of a torpedo aircraft being shot down in the direction 230 degrees.
- At 20.22 hours, it was reported that a aircraft was shot down in the direction 260 degrees. ‘Prinz Eugens’ anti-aircraft artillery took the credit for this.
- At 20.23, a aircraft was shot at by heavy flak, but they stop firing, when their own fighters arrived.
- At 20.24 hours, an enemy aircraft was shot down by heavy flak in the direction 70 degrees.
- At 20.28 hours, ‘Prinz Eugens’ Ar 196 shot down an enemy aircraft in the direction 40 degrees. The enemy aircraft passed the cruiser with one of its engines stopped.
The escorting destroyers Z25 and ‘Paul Jacobi’ took part in firing at the attacking aircraft. Their 12.5 guns were especially effective, and fired barrage shooting. The two torpedo boats, T12 and T11, were extremely active, as they sailed astern for ‘Prinz Eugen’, where much of the attack occurred. T12 maintained, after the attack, that it had shot down two enemy aircraft.
During the attack, ‘Prinz Eugen’ was escorted by Bf 109s from III./JG 1, which on the 14th of May, transferred parts of the unit from Jutland to Kjevik at Kristiansand, in order to fly protection for ‘L%FCtzow’ and ‘Prinz Eugen’. After the attack, the fighter aircraft demanded credit for having shot down 6 aircraft:
Unit Pilot Claim Time Position
III./JG 1 Lt. Deterra Hudson 20.10 20 km SW Lister
9./JG 1 Uffz. Hoes Blenheim 20.15 25 km S Lister
8./JG 1 Ofw. Greiner Blenheim 20.17 25 km S Lindenes
III./JG 1 Lt. Richter Hudson 20.18 20 km S Lister
9./JG 1 Uffz. Schramm Beaufort 20.25 40 km S Lister
9./JG 1 Uffz. St%F6wer Blenheim 20.26 42 km SSO Lister
The attack on ‘Prinz Eugen’ was carried out by two formations of Beauforts, led by W/Cdr. Williams and S/Ldr. Dinsdale respectively.
Williams' formation consisted of F/Sgt. Manning, W/Cdr. Williams and F/O Birchley flying furthest to the left, with F/O Archar together with P/O McKern and P/O Oughton flying on the far right.
F/Sgt. Manning discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ at 20.15 hours, and attacked together with Birchley and Williams. ‘Prinz Eugen’ had begun to change course when Manning attacked, and he believed that he was in a good position to hit the German ship. At 20.17 hours, he was attacked by a Bf 109, which didn't hit the Beaufort after all, as Manning turned sharply to the left. A minute later, Manning dropped his torpedo at a distance he extimated as 1000 to 1200 yards. During the evasive maneouver, after the torpedo drop, the rear gunner and the wireless operator in the Beaufort, shot at the cruiser with machine guns. Manning saw that ‘Prinz Eugen’ was starting to turn towards the torpedo, but didn't have time to look after possible hits. Mannings aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft artillery, and was severely damaged, at the same time that the Beaufort was attacked by three Bf 109s. The German fighters' approaches were made difficult by an attacking Beaufighter, which probably saved Mannings life. One Bf 109 was driven away by the Beaufighter, and another turned of. The last Bf 109 attacked an hit, among other things, the rear gunner in the Beaufort. He was slightly wounded. The wireless operator took over the rear gunners place until he again was ready to man his turret. The rear gunner fired a long volley, which was seen hitting one of the German fighters. Manning believed that the German pilots were not very experienced, and that they fired too low, and were not particularly willing to follow up the attack on the damaged Beaufighter. Manning managed to get Beaufort AW-D back to Leuchars, where he executed an emergency landing at 22.40 hours.
The two other Beauforts in Mannings ‘Vic’, W/Cdr. Williams and F/O Birchley, were bothe shot down. W/Cdr. Williams survived the crash and was picked up together with his navigator, Al Morris (who had just been transferred to Williams crew right before the start from Leuchars). Morris died shortly after.
F/O Archar, P/O McKern and P/O Oughton attacked at the same time. P/O Oughton dropped his torpedo at 20.12 hours at a distance of 1200 yards. His aircraft was attacked by a Bf 109, that fired to high and missed the British plane. Six Bf 109s were seen in all, but only one of them attacked P/O Oughton. The wireless operator shot at one of the fighters with 30 rounds, but none of them hit.
P/O McKern dropped his torpedo at 20.22 hours from an altitude of 70 feet, and at a distance of around 1200 yards. During the approach, a Bf 109 attacked, and the rear gunner opened fire. It was observed that the German aircraft was hit, and it immediately aborted the attack. Both the rear gunner and the observator believed that the German aircraft dived out of control, but straightened out close to the seas surface.
F/O Archer was shot down at 20.24 hours, and it is not known if he managed to drop his torpedo. The anti-aircraft fire was murderous during the approach.
At 20.35 hours, P/O Oughton saw Beaufighter LA-A from No. 235 Squadron, fall into the sea. The two crew members, W/O Saffodini and Sgt. Taylor, came out of the aircraft and a Blenheim dropped a dinghy down to them. P/O Oughton sent a radio message at 21.03 hours, reporting the position of the dinghy.
The second section attacks
S/Ldr. Dinsdale discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ a bit later than W/Cdr. Williams. At 20.19 hours, two Bf 109s were observed turning towards the Beaufort formation. Dinsdale was able to observe around 20 Bf 109s and 2 Bf 110s all in all. Dinsdales aircraft had still not been attacked by the enemy fighters. One minute later, ‘Prinz Eugen’ was observed and Dinsdale dropped his torpedo at a distance of 1500 yards. Upon coming back to Leuchars, Dinsdale reported that he had seen an explosion around one minute after the attack. Black smoke and dirty water was seen by pilot and observer. The water column was as high as ‘Prinz Eugen’ was long, and around 15 seconds later, another big explosion was observed. There was not, however, a torpedo hit on the ‘prinz Eugen’. What Dinsdale had seen was probably a torpedo that exploded before its target, or a aircraft that crashed.
Dinsdale constituted ‘Vic’, together with F/Sgt. Nichol in AW-B and Sgt. Whiteside in AW-T. F/Sgt. Nichol dropped his torpedo from a distance of 1100 yards, all the while he was being attacked by a Bf 109 at an angle of around 15 degrees. The German fighter opened fire at a distance of around 500 metres, and the projectiles went above the Beaufort at the same moment that the torpedo was dropped. After the torpedo drop, Nichols turned sharply to the left and passed below the German fighter, but above and in front of Sgt. Whiteside. Sgt. Whiteside dropped his torpedo from 1500 metres distance and saw, as Dinsdale, a large explosion in the direction of the cruiser. During the attack, Whiteside was exposed to intense anti-aircraft fire, but the German fighters didn't attack the Beaufort, even though two Bf 109s flew at around 500 feet above S/Ldr. Dinsdale.
At 20.37 hours, Whiteside saw a Beaufort or a Blenheim in flames, which slowly lost altitude and attempted to make an emergency landing in the sea. Another aircraft circled above the area where the emergency landing was made.
F/Sgt. Nichols saw a He 115 at 20.53 hours going in the opposite direction. The German aircraft fired a flare with five red stars. The flare was presumably an attempt at calling help from the German fighters, which were in the area. Both Dinsdale, Nichols and Whiteside managed to get back to Leuchars, where they landed a few minutes after each other.
The last ‘Vic’ of Beauforts consisted of F/Lt. Pett, F/O Kerr and P/O Dewhurst. Al three crews managed to get back to Leuchars as well. F/Lt. Pett, who was the leader of ‘vic’, dropped his torpedo at 20.20 hours, at a distance of 2000 yards, which was the furthest distance any of the aircraft had dropped their torpedoes. F/Lt. Pett was under attack by three Bf 109s both before and after the torpedo drop. Petts gunner maintained that they had hit two of the German fighters, but no crash was observed.
F/O Kerr dropped the torpedo at a distance of 1200 yards and was under attack by a Bf 109 as well. Kerr turned abruptly to the left and avoided a burst at short range. P/O Dewhurst dropped the torpedo at a 1500 yard distance and carried out an evasive maneouver immediately after, as he was under heavy fire from both light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery. Four Bf 109s were observed, but none of them attacked P/O Dewhurst. Dewhurst also saw the explosion near ‘Prinz Eugen’, but believed that it came from a crashed aircraft.
The four Beaufighters, which escorted No. 42 Squadron, did what they could to minimize the anti-aircraft fire against the torpedo aircraft. Beaufighter LA-V flew in front of the torpedo aircraft, and fired at one of the destroyers with 20 mm and machine guns. All in all, 600 rounds were fired, and it was observed that the bridge and the fore deck of the destroyer were hit. The German ship answered the fire with accurate machine gun fire and light flak.
At 20.17 hours, W/O Pike, in Beafighter WR-T attacked the destroyer in front with 200 rounds 20 mm machine cannon and 600 rounds from machine guns. The fire was opened at a distance of 800 yards, and W/O Pike stopped first when he was at a distance of just 100 metres. Numerous hits were seen on board the destroyer, and the anti-aircraft fire declined considerably during the attack. A powerful explosion was seen in the middle of the enemy formation at 20.20 hours.
W/O Maurice, in WR-Q, overtook the torpedo aircraft during their approach, and attacked the German ships from behind with machine cannon fire. After the first pass, Maurice was attacked by a Bf 109, but was able to evade it. At 20.18, Maurice saw an aircraft enveloped in flames crash into the sea. The aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft artillery from ‘Prinz Eugen’. After that, Maurice attacked one of the destroyers, which had started to lay a smokescreen. At 20.35 hours, Maurice met the two Beauforts, as well as another aircraft, which made a landing in the sea immediately after, only to hold itself afloat for just a few seconds. P/O Maurice circled over the position for a short time, as did the two Beauforts, but there were no survivors.
Beaufighter LA-A, which was flown by W/O Saffodini, was hit by anti-aircraft fire, and had to land on (in?) the sea around 25 miles off Egersund. Both Saffodini and Sgt. Taylor were seen coming out of the aircraft, and S/Ldr. McHardy from No. 404 Squadron, dropped a dinghy down to the crew in distress.
McHardy was flying one of the six Blenheims, which had the task of flying dummy torpedo attacks in order to diminish the anti-aircraft fire agains the Beauforts. McHardy was carrying out dummy attacks on one of the destroyers, when he was attacked by a Bf 109, which opened fire at a distance of 400 yards. The German aircraft suddenly changed direction, and chose to attack another aircraft, whereafter Hardy escaped. After the attack, McHardy discovered that Beaufighter LA-A was having difficulties, and flew up alongside the Beaufighter, which had lost the cowling on the right engine. Smoke and flames came out of the engine, and there was the risk that the aircraft would explode. After the emergency landing, McHardy circled over the area and dropped a dinghy, which landed only 30 yards from the distressed crew. Both crew members were seen crawling up into the rubber boat. At 20.42 hours, a position for the emergency landing was sent, and McHardy set course towards Leuchars, where he landed at 22.57 hours.
The leader of the Blenheim formation, W/Cdr. Woodruff, in EE-M, also carried out at dummy attack on one of the destroyers. His aircraft was also attacked by a Bf 109, which first broke off the attack at a distance of 100 yards. The navigator on board the Blenheim was wounded in one knees and EE-M was damaged. After the attack by the Bf 109 stopped, the rear gunner gave first aid to the navigator. During the entire approach, EE-M was being fired at by heavy flak from the destroyers. After the attack, W/Cdr Woodruff observed a He 115 at a distance of 9 km, but refrained from attacking because of the fuel situation.
F/Sgt. Butler, in EE-T, also approached the destroyers in front of ‘Prinz Eugen’. During the approach, F/Sgt. Butler saw a Bf 109, which attacked a Beaufort. Butler attacked in order to ease the Beauforts approach. Butler was fortunate in having been able to chase the Bf 109 away, but the Beaufort was hit by flak from ‘Prinz Eugen’, and crashed burning into the sea. Butler fired a two-second burst at the German aircraft, which was seen hitting the fuselage. After the attack, the rear gunner on EE-T observed a Beaufort, which tried get attention by shooting down into the sea. Butler flew alongside the Beaufort and escorted it back to Leuchars, where Butler landed at 23.02 hours.
W/O Bolli and F/Lt. McCutchson turned to the right as the Beauforts went into an attack. W/O Bolli observed a two-engined aircraft, presumably a Bf 110, which passed in front of him, but the enemy aircraft had disappeared again before any of the two Blenheims could react. After the attack was over, the two Blenheims joined the Beauforts and flew back to Leuchars.
W/O Bell also turned off when the Beauforts went into their attack. He saw Woodruff get attacked, and attacked the Bf 109 from the left at a distance of 400 yards. Bell fired a two-second burst without having observed if there were any hits. The Bf 109, however, turned away. Bell landed at Leuchars at 22.45 hours.
Several of the attacking British aircraft gave reports of two different destroyer forces, which was also correct. At 17.30 hours, ‘Unternehmen Burgund’ began, where the destroyers Z29 and Z27, ‘Richard Beitzen’ and ‘Hans Lody’ were to reinforce Westwall mine field in Skagerrak (Sperre 17b). The four destroyers had been supplied with fuel during the day, and had taken mines on board, and had left Kristiansand. At 20.00 hours, the mine-laying force was close to ‘Prinz Eugen’, and at 20.21 hours, destroyer Z29 shot down an enemy aircraft, which had first been shot at by ‘Prinz Eugen’. The aircraft was by the flak crew recognised as being a Boston. All four crew members from the aircraft were picked up by Z27. At 01.37 hours, the mine-laying began, and was finished within an hour. At 10.00 hours, the destroyers were back in Kristiansand, where they again received fuel.
The bombing of the Prinz Eugen
After the torpedo attack, the lookout personnel on the ‘Prinz Eugen’ observed two aircraft at high altitude, which dropped 3 and 5 bombs respectively. All the bombs landed at the rear of the German ship. The two aircraft were Hudsons from No. 608 Squadron. P/O Keeble, in UL-U, dropped four 250 lb SAP from an altitude of 13,000 feet. The bombs were equipped with a .127 second delay, so they would have the possibility to break through the armour before detonating. The crew saw the four bombs hit around 300 feet behind ‘Prinz Eugen’, which sailed evasive maneouvers. During the entire attack, Keeble was exposed to heavy flak.
P/O Walker, in Hudson UL-M, dropped four 250 lb SAP from an altitude of 13,000 feet. None of the bombs hit the cruiser, but fell 100 feet behind the ship. After the attack, P/O Walker was attacked by a Bf 109F, but the German fighter broke off his attack after a short burst from Hudsens gunner.
P/O Paisley from No. 48 Squadron, didn't return from the operation, and was presumably shot down by Lt. Deterra or Richter from III./JG 1. At 20.05 hours, P/O Ellison from No. 48 Squadron, saw two Bf 109s, flying at 20,000 feet. Ellison went into a dive and turned out over the sea, all the time increasing his speed. Ellison managed to escape the two fighters. P/O Bennett from the same squadron, saw neither ship nor enemy fighter. He did, however, see fire on the sea under him, but due to the altitude, 14,000 feet, he couldn't see what was burning. He returned without having dropped any bombs.
The six aircraft from No. 608 Squadron didn't get to drop their bombs either. P/O Smith saw the German naval force off Lister, but didn't attack. A Bf 109 was seen and the Hudson fired 250 rounds at the German aircraft, without visible result. The German fighter didn't attack. P/O Austin also saw the naval force and cruised above it for awhile, but did not bomb. P/O austin was neither fired at by the flak, nor was he attacked by fighters.
P/O Walensly, in UL-A, was not able to finde his target, and aborted at 20.33 hours. Sgt. Hanson, in UL-G, spotted ‘Prinz Eugen’ and its escort, but did not attack. Instead, Sgt. Hanson sent a report to Leuchars, telling of its position.
P/O Lovelace didn't find ‘Prinz Eugen’, but was instead approached by a Bf 109, which he managed to escape. Lovelace saw a fire on the sea and the observer took pictures of the smoke.
P/O Sehslefield discovered ‘Prinz Eugen’ at 20.03 hours and prepared himself for the attack at an altitude of 15,000 feet, when he was attacked by two Bf 109s. Just before this, he had been fired at by flak without any damages to his aircraft. The two German fighters caused some damage to UL-H. The Hudson answered the fire, and one of the Bf 109s was seen being hit. P/O Sehslefield managed to escape the two German fighters, and he landed at Leuchars at 22.22 hours.
At 21.57 hours, the air raid warning for the German naval force was cancelled, and ‘Prinz Eugen’ continued down in Skagerrak towards Kiel. Three minutes later, Luftwaffe discontinued their escort of the ships. On the 18th of May, at 1940 hours, ‘Prinz Eugen’ passed the lightship at Kiel after a tour down through the Great Belt. One-and-half-hours later, the ship was moored in Kiel harbour.
The attack on ‘Prinz Eugen’ was exaggerated by German propaganda. Both the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine tried to take credit for much more than they actually did. One Hudson, one Beaufighter and seven Beauforts had been shot down. The Germans claimed that they had shot down altogether 38 aircraft. On the other hand, the attacking British aircraft claimed that they had shot down numerous Bf 109s.
The attack on ‘Prinz Eugen’ was a victory for the German Kriegsmarine. Coastal Command had not managed to sink the German cruiser, even though it was discovered quite early during its attempt to break out. ‘Prinz Eugen’ had been seriously damaged during the submarine attack on February 23rd, and it had not been possible to repair the ship in Norway. It managed to escape to Kiel even though Coastal Command tried to stop the cruiser.
The Blenheims should have been pulled back from Coastal Command at least one year earlier, and the Hudsons couldn't cause a cruiser like ‘Prinz Eugen’ much damage. The Beauforts were too slow to handle themselves against German fighters like the Bf 109, and the cooperation between the different British units were not particularly good. Coastal Command did, however, learn from the attack, and during the next years, Coastal Command Strike Wings were developed to be a strong and feared weapon.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
20:46:55 Thursday, April 1, 2004
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There seems to be some confusion as to which aircraft K.Fullager was on, my source lists him as being lost on the 14 /10/41 on board N1163 this is confirmed by the CWGC site as far as date of death goes.
There seems to be a problem as to whether AW375 was at Bu Amud or in Norway. Was it a 39sq aircraft or a 42 sq plane, was there another sgt Fullager.
I note that Floyd quotes a P Fullagar note the spelling this is most confusing!!!
K P J FULLAGAR is the spelling on the CWGC for the loss on 14/10/41 so my sources spelling must be wrong.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
22:43:08 Thursday, April 1, 2004
Since my last post I have checked the CWGC site and the spelling of fowles I quoted also appears to be wrong and should read Sgt Leslie Thomas Powles 751356 RAVR.
all the best
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
08:53:32 Saturday, May 1, 2004
Thanks for all the additional info. Very interesting to read.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
Author: floyd williston (Guest)
16:40:20 Saturday, May 1, 2004
Clearly the information in They Shall Grow Not Old about KPJ Fullagar being in the same crew as AHA Morris is incorrect as they died on different dates. However, they appear to have been in the same squadron and both are buried in he Vanse, Norway, cemetery.
RE: Beaufort N1163 and Beaufort AW375
20:41:33 Saturday, May 1, 2004
I think that the last thing in the world you need to do is apologize for an error in another publication!!!
You are one of the bulwarks of this forum and supply a absolute mine of information to everyone including rank amateurs like myself.
Any ideas on the Bu Amud discrepency.